海外之声 | OMFIF董事总经理：中国继续推进全球安全网（中英双语）

中文译文如下：

中国继续推进全球安全网

与特朗普政策相背的多边行动

戴维·马什

翻译：陈文烨

审校：陆可凡

中国目前似乎正准备在扩大的全球安全网中扮演愈加重要的角色，与国际货币基金组织（IMF）一起共同协助陷入国际收支困境的国家。

昨日，五年一度的中国共产党全国代表大会在北京开幕。会后，这一政策路线将能得以推行。路线强调了中国在世界舞台上采取多边途径的愿望，与特朗普政府奉行的单边主义形成鲜明对比。

中国采取的行动，可能包括各央行和其他官方金融机构间更广泛的货币互换安排，是几年来旨在克服许多国家不愿向IMF寻求财政援助的手段之一。IMF借款的臭名很大程度上源于1997-98年亚洲金融危机期间IMF对亚洲施行的财政政策给各国带来的痛苦经历——其政策被普遍批评为过于严苛。

中国正通过支持国际货币基金组织着力加强的多边行动和同时表明可以根据需要推进自己的项目来实现多重目标。一是中国希望在国际金融机构中建立幕后影响力。其次，中国迫切希望确保具有潜在脆弱性的新兴经济体能够承受美国较高利率可能带来的流动性短缺。第三，中国希望保住自己全球最大债权国之一的地位，以应对受美国货币政策“正常化”困扰的债务国之间可能出现的债务偿还危机。

第四，中国意在不威胁到美元主导地位的前提下提高人民币的国际地位，加强国际互换安排网络，在这种网络下人民币可以兑换成当地货币，以增加各国外汇储备头寸。还可提供未来几年所需的备用人民币流动性，以帮助结算国外以人民币计价的贸易，投资和资本市场债务。

第五，中国需要调整规划，以应对美国在贸易和投资方面可能愈演愈烈的反华行动。这些行动会加剧全球贸易保护主义的恐慌，也反映出华盛顿方面认为中国从国际贸易和金融安排中获得了不公平的优势。美国一方面谴责中国在对美贸易中的巨额顺差，一方面越来越怀疑中国在为欧亚贸易和交通融资的“一带一路”倡议方面的政策，声称这是对美国企业和利益的歧视。

上周的新闻就是一个最好的例子。报道中，特朗普政府以增资为条件要求世行整改对中国的放贷政策。华盛顿方面声称，中国通过利用美国支持下的世行资金扩大自己对各种新兴经济体的贷款，削弱了西方政策并取得了自己不应得的影响力。中国官员驳回了这一指控，称这一言论说明美国不了解世行的运行机制。

中国的整体政策表明他们正在寻求多种兼容选择。美国习惯性地声称中国正试图在布雷顿森林体系（世行和IMF都在1994年那场重要会议上成立）之外建立替代品，以规避多边金融机构。通过支持总部在北京的亚投行（AIIB）和总部在上海的新开发银行（NDB）（美国在两个银行都没有股权），中国意在表明自己是希望IMF在国际金融中扮演更重要角色的几个国家之一。

IMF执行董事会在历时一年的讨论后，计划使用短期流动性调节工具。通过基金组织的互换协议，提供备用硬通货，巩固各国外汇储备以应对可能的外部货币冲击。“短期流动性互换”将能提供比IMF现有的全部借贷工具更为灵活的信贷额度。其主要目的为在面临持续低水平的流动性压力，而非内部或外部原因导致的爆发式资本外流时，满足总体上经营良好的国家的需求。

东盟的五个主要成员国（印度尼西亚，马来西亚、菲律宾、新加坡和泰国）已经被认定为IMF互换安排的潜在参与国。其中比较发达的新加坡在东盟中较大的发言权将有可能克服债务国对IMF的厌恶态度。

启动互换安排的准备工作已经搁置，这在一定程度上是因为美国和东盟的兴趣减退。然而，这项工作仍可能会由于象征性原因，在下次IMF和世行年会之前重新启动。下次年会将于2018年10月在巴厘岛举办，是6年来首次在亚洲举办。

在今年于华盛顿举办的IMF和世行年会结束之际，中国人民银行行长周小川在G30国际银行研讨会上发表了演讲。他强调了中国在国际经济治理方面的角色，尽管他说会重点关注解决国内问题。周小川称人民币互换协议是金融危机的意外产物，还表示：“中国支持进一步发展全球安全网，这可能比双边安排更为有效”。

英文原文如下：

China moves on global safety net

Multilateral action contrasting with Trump

David Marsh in New York

Thu 19 Oct 2017

China appears to be preparing for an increasing role in an expanded 'global safety net' to assist countries that run into balance of payments difficulties, in concert with the International Monetary Fund.

This policy line, which could gain momentum after the quinquennial Communist party congress that started yesterday in Beijing, emphasises China's wish for a multilateral approach on the world stage in pronounced contrast to the unilateralism of the US administration under President Donald Trump.

The Chinese moves, which could include wider currency swap arrangements among central banks and other official financial institutions, form part of several years of manoeuvrings aimed at overcoming many countries' reluctance to seek financial help from the Fund. The stigma attached to IMF borrowing stems in large part from the bitter legacy of the Fund's Asia policies – widely criticised as over-harsh – during the Asian financial crisis in 1997-98.

By backing IMF-strengthening multilateral action while at the same time showing it can advance with its own initiatives if needed, China is following multiple aims. First, it wishes to build behind-the-scenes influence on international financial organisations. Second, it is keen to assure that potentially vulnerable emerging economies can withstand possible liquidity shortages flowing from higher US interest rates. Third, it wants to protect its own position as one of the world's largest creditors in case of payments difficulties among debtor countries troubled by US monetary 'normalisation'.

Fourth, Beijing aims to buttress the renminbi's international role without questioning the dollar's current primacy. Reinforcing a network of international swap arrangements under which renminbi can be exchanged for local currencies can serve the purpose of strengthening countries' reserve positions. It can also provide back-up renminbi liquidity needed in coming years to help settle foreign nations' trade, investment and capital market obligations denominated in the Chinese currency.

Fifth, China needs to adapt its planning to a possible sharpening of anti-Beijing action from the US in both trade and investment. Such moves, which would heighten fears of world protectionism, would reflect Washington's perception that China is gaining unfair advantages from international trading and financial arrangements. As well as castigating China's large bilateral surplus on US trade, Washington is intensely suspicious of China's policies on the Belt and Road initiative financing Eurasian trade and transport links, alleging that these discriminate against US companies and interests.

As another prime example, news emerged last week that the Trump administration is demanding the World Bank reconfigures lending to China as the condition for a capital rise. Washington claims China undercuts western policies and gains undue influence by using US-backed World Bank money to expand its own lending to diverse emerging market economies. Chinese officials reject the charge, saying it shows the US does not understand how the World Bank works.

In its overarching policies, China is demonstrating that it is pursuing a variety of compatible options. Washington habitually claims that China is trying to circumvent multilateral financial organisations by building alternatives outside the Bretton Woods institutions – the Fund and Bank set up at the seminal 1944 conference. Alongside its backing for the Beijing-domiciled Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and the Shanghai-based New Development Bank – where the US has no shareholding in either bank – China wants to demonstrate that it is one of several countries trying to make the IMF more relevant in international finance.

The IMF executive board has been discussing for more than a year plans for a short-term liquidity facility through the Fund's own swap lines under which the organisation could provide hard currency back-up to reinforce countries' foreign exchange reserves in case of possible externally generated monetary shocks. The 'short-term liquidity swap' would be a more flexible credit line than the Fund's existing panoply of lending instruments and would aim to meet the needs of generally well-run countries facing continuous low-level liquidity pressures rather than sudden outflows for internal or external reasons.

Five key members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations – Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand – have been targeted as potentially participating in the IMF swap arrangements. The relatively large number and the presence of well-off Singapore are intended to overcome debtor countries' reservations over stigmatisation.

Preparations for the swap line activation have been put on hold, partly because of a cooling of interest from both the US and Asean side. However, this could be revived for important symbolic reasons ahead of the next IMF-World Bank annual meeting, in Asia for the first time for six years, in Bali in October 2018.

Speaking in Washington at a G30 seminar on Sunday, at the close of this year's IMF-World Bank meetings, Zhou Xiaochuan, governor of the People's Bank of China, highlighted Beijing's role in international economic governance, although he said the domestic agenda took precedence. He termed renminbi swap agreements an unexpected outcome of the 2008 financial crisis. He added: 'China supports the further development of a global safety net. In our view, the global safety net may be more efficient than bilateral arrangements.'